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THE CO!\STITUTIO:\IAL RIGHTS OF
TEACHERS AND.PROFESSORSt
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE*

In 1926, a young Tennessee biology teacher, John Thomas
Scopes, was charged with "teach[ing] in the public schools ... a
certain theory that denied the story of the divine creation of man, as
taught in the Bible, and teach[ing] instead thereof that man had
descended from a lower order of animals," 1 all in violation of a
Tennessee criminal statute.2 Broadcast over radio and widely covered
t This article does not attempt to review substantial sources of legal protection teachers and
professors may hold under state statutes, administrative codes, collective bargaining
agreements, or the common law of contracts. Neither does it review the substantial influence of
accrediting associations and professional associations in the development of standards, the
effective use of their good offices to secure institutional compliance with those standards, and the
use of their resources to secure redresS" in individual cases. These are, in fact, substantial sources
of quasi-legal protection. In the past academic year alone, the American Association of
University Professors acted on nearly 750 complaints. For a brief description of current case
work by the AAUP, see Committee A on Aeademic Freedom and Tenure, Report 1969-1970,56
A.A.U.P. BULL. 153 (1970); B. Davis, Principles and Cases: The Mediative Work of the
AA UP, in id. at 169. Increasingly, the National Education Association has added to the
professional services available to aggrieved teaehers.
Confined to a discussion of constitutional norms, this article also makes no effort to review
the complex tests distinguishing schools and colleges still regarded as sufficiently "private" that
thej may not be uniformly bound by the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment, or federal
statutes based solely on the power of Congress to implement these provisions of the
Constitution. For further consideration of this closely related subject, see O'Neil, Private
Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action and the
Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1970). For a bibliography of material in this area,
see Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and
Practice, 1970 DUKE L.J. 763,808.
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
An abridged version of this article will appear in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE (Dorsen ed. 1970).
I. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105,289 S.W. 363 (1927).
2. Acts of 1925, ch. 27, § l, [1925) Tenn. Laws 50, as amended. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 491922 (1966 Replacement) (repealed 1967).
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by national reporters including the redoubtable H.L. Mencken, the
trial pitted William Jennings Bryan as special counsel for the state
against the formidable skills of Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield
Hays. While the courtroom drama of the Scopes Monkey Trial is
familiar to many, hardly anyone remembers that Scopes was
convicted and fined $100, that he immediately dropped out of
teaching, and soon thereafter moved to another state.
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, counsel for Scopes
raised two claims of constitutional significan~. Contending first that
the underlying statute offended the religious establishment clause of
the state constitution,3 they also argued that the anti-evolution statute,
as applied, violated the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution by abridging Scopes' liberty to teach the subject of
biology freely, according to his own best professional understanding.
Again, however, the immediate outcome was a libertarian disaster.
The Tennessee Supreme Court observed that the criminal statute
did not forbid either Scopes or anyone else to express his personal or
professional views about the Bible, evolution, or any other subject
when he did so merely as a private citizen acting on his own time,
outside the environment of a public school classroom. It pointed out,
moreover, that the statute had no application to private schools and to
private teachers who were wholly at liberty to utilize their freedom of
contract, their property, and their professional skills to provide
whatever latitude of teaching freedom they desired. Conceding that
the state might be constitutionally restricted from unlimited control
over such private arrangements, 4 the court held that the fourteenth
amendment had no similar relevance to statutes limited to on-the-job
duties of public employees.5 Scopes had not been compelled to teach
in the public schools; the conditions on which the opportunity was
made available to him were freely disclosed in advance, and he need
not have accepted the job if for any reason he found the terms
distasteful. Moreover, the court reasoned, having subsequently
resolved that he could no longer conscientiously perform his duties, he
3. TENN. CoNST. art. I, § 3.
4. The United States Supreme Court had recently taken a similar position in invalidating two
state laws as applied to private school teachers and private schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law required parents to enroll children in a public school, forbidding
enrollment in a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (law forbade the
teaching of german in any school to children below the eighth grade).
5. 154 Tenn. at 109-10,289 S.W. at 365-66.
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was free to give notice and to resign without recrimination by the state
or inquiry into his reasons. So long as he worked for the state,
however, he had no right to disregard the public will manifest in the
criminal law applicable to his responsibilities within the public
employment relationship. Indeed, in the view of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution did
not apply at all:
[Scopes] had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such terms as
the state prescribed.
The statute before us . . . is an act of the state as a corporation, a proprietor,
an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of work the
master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with its own
employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the
limitations of . .. the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.'

If the Tennessee court had noticed a paragraph in an opinion of
the Supreme Court of t_he United States issued only six months
earlier, it might not have treated teacher Scopes' claim so lightly.
While the case before the Supreme Court in Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Commission 7 had been wholly different and less dramatic on
its facts, dealing merely with the regulation of trucks on state-owned
public highways, the general character of the overall constitutional
issue was very similar in both cases. In Frost the Supreme Court
assumed that no one had a constitutional right to force a state to
construct public roads and that the plaintiff trucking company would
have had no recourse had it been unable to haul goods at all for lack
of such state-provided roads. The Court then considered whether these
facts necessarily implied that the state could arbitrarily attach
whatever conditions it wished upon the use of its roads on the claim
that any permitted use would be a mere "privilege" that the state was
free to withhold entirely:
The naked question which we have to determine, therefore, is whether the state
may impose [an] unconstitutional requirement as a condition precedent to the
enjoyment of a privilege, which, without so deciding, we shall assume to be
within the power of the state altogether to withhold if it sees fit to do.so.8
6. Id. at 111-12,289 S.W. at 3~5 (emphasis added). Although the court ultimately
reversed Scopes' conviction on the ground that the trial judge-in levying the $100 fine against
Scopes-had improperly exercised a power reserved to the jury under the state constitution, it
noted that since Scopes "is no longer in the service of the state •.. , [w]e see nothing to be
gained by prolonging the life of this bizarre case." /d. at 121,289 S.W. at 367.
7. 271 u.s. 583 (1926).
8. /d. at 592-93.
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Concluding that governmental control-unrestrained by any
limitation of the fourteenth amendment-over the use of state-owned
roads was a far more menacing power than a more limited prerogative
simply to decide whether to have such roads at all, the Court
concluded that the proprietary position of the state did not immunize
it from the fourteenth amendment:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold . . • . If the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence.'

In 1968, forty-one years after the celebrated trial of John Thomas
Scopes and after a long series of other cases applying this doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, 10 the Supreme Court corrected the
9. I d. at 593-94. See also Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). "The
United States may give up the Post Office wben it sees fit, but while it carries it on the usc of the
mails is almost as mucb as part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." Id. at 437
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. For a discussion and examination of the doctrine, see R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF
DEPENDENCY: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE STATE (1970); French, Unconstitutional
Conditions: An Analysis, SO GEo. LJ. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Welfare Benefits with Strings A ttacized, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Oppenheim,
Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. REV. 176 (1927); Powell, The
Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 99 (1916); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968);
Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968); Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). Leading cases within the past two
decades expressly applying the doctrine include Goldbctg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)
(hearing required prior to termination of welfare benefits); Tiuker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (public school student's first amendment rights protected); Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (right of teacher in public school to criticize the
board of education upheld); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 US. 670,678 (1967) (tenant in
public housing may not be evicted without being informed of the reasons for the eviction and
given an opportunity to respond to thechatges); Garrity v. New Jersey,385 U.S.493,500 (1967)
(state may not force police officers to forego their privilege against self-incrimination in
connection with investigation of alleged misconduct); Kcyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967) (faculty members at public university may not be compelled to surrender all
first amendment rights); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379-80 (1964) (first amendment
freedom of state employees including teachers protected); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404
(1963) (state may not abridge unemployment compensation recipient's free exercise of religion);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,495-96 (1961) (requirement that notary public declare his
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Tennessee court's abandonment of the rights of teachers under the
Constitution. Reviewing a nearly identical Arkansas statute
forbidding both the teaching of a theory that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals and the use in the public
schools of any textbook teaching such a theory, 11 the Court concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional as a law respecting an
establishment of religion foreclosed to the state by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment: ''There is and can be no doubt
that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that
teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." 12 In response to
Arkansas' claim that it was not restricted by the fourteenth
amendment in the operation of its own schools or in its relations with
its own employee-teachers, the Court simply noted that "it is much
too late to argue that the State may impose upon the teachers in its
schools any conditions that it chooses, however restrictive they may
be of constitutional guarantees." 13
In essence, the Constitution had assimilated the simple truth of
Alexander Hamilton's observation that "[a) power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will." 14 That sort of power
must yield to the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, teachers and
professors are not bereft of constitutional protection against
governmental threats of dismissal on grounds which are otherwise
violative of their substantive constitutional rights. Rather, "[t)o state
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government
employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable,
lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper
authorities." 15 In the particular determination of what constitutes
belief in the existence of God violates the first amendment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
5 18 (1958) (first amendment rights of taxpayers protected); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350
U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (summary dismissal of city school teacher who invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination before legislative investigating committee prohibited); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (public employee protected against arbitrary and
discriminatory action by the state).
II. ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 80-1627, 1628 (1960 Replacement) codifying Act No. I, § I,
[1929] Ark. Acts 50.
12. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
13. /d.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 235 (Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton).
IS. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551,555 (1956) (emphasis added). The reference
to "nondiscriminatory" terms of public employment, incidentally: discloses a second principal
source of substantive constitutional protection: the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
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"reasonable" conditions, moreover, the trend of the last decade has
been increasingly to resolve doubtful cases in favor of the teacher
because of additional considerations of public interest identified with
his professional security. It is outrageous enough that political
conformity not justified by compelling exigencies of the moment or by
the uniq1,1e nature of a particular public office should be demanded of
any group of employees, private or public, by threats to their jobs, 18
but the public consequences may be doubly unfortunate if such
conditions could be imposed on teachers:
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades
to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge
in hyperbole . . . . The functions of educational institutions in our national
life and the conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them
are at the basis of [constitutional] limitations upon State and National power.n

The drive of the judicial process has, as a consequence, severely
restricted the use of political litmus tests for teaching eligibility and
checked the tendency of school boards and legislatures to police the
extramural political utterances and private lives of teachers through
threats to their jobs. Specifically, political disclaimer oaths, bans on
membership in feared or hated political organizations or unions,
discharge for extramuraPs criticism, and dismissal or revocation of
amendment. Protection from arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory distinctions between those
considered eligible for teaching and those ineligible to teach proceeds from the assurance of
equal protection wholly irrespective of whether the opportunity to teach in public institutions is
one of privilege rather than one of right: ~·we need not pause to consider whether an abstract
right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection docs
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitral)' or
discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). See also Trisler v. University
of Miss., 420 F .2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
16. For other discussions of the rights of public employees, see Linde, Justice Douglas on
Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4
(1964); O'Neil, Public Employment, Antiwar Protest and Preinduction Review, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1028 (1970); Reich, The New Properly, 13 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The

~

'

Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Cqmment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old
Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 751 (1969); Comment, The First Amendment and Public
Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
409 (1968); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 380 (1969).

17. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. The phrase "extramural" is used figuratively in reference to statements made outside of
the employment relationship and not merely to statements made outside the walls of the campus.
It is perfectly clear that the place where the statement is made, whether on or off campus, is not
per se determinative of the question whether the teacher is speaking as a private citizen, albeit
one whose views may presumably be informed by his profession and his association with an
academic institution.
·
I',
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teaching certificates for private behavior not specifically shown to
affect the teacher's professional competency, his intramural working
relationships, or his classroom integrity gradually have all been
rolled back by judicial decree. 19
An excellent case law survey of teachers' and professors'
substantive constitutional rights appears elsewhere and need not be
imitated here. 20 In passing, however, certain of the better settled
propositions merit restatement:
I. Membership per se in political organizations, not excluding
the Communist Party, or economic organizations such as labor
!unions is not a permissible ground for terminating teachers or
disqualifying applicants to the profession. Arguably, moreover, not
even active and knowing membership including some degree of
personal sympathy for the illegal objectives of the group may be
sufficient, short of some concrete act in furtherance of an illegal
objective inconsistent with one's lawful obligations as a teacher. 21
2. Correspondingly, disclaimer oaths requiring that one
forswear activities or associations he is otherwise constitutionally
privileged to pursue as a private citizen are beyond the constitutional
pale. In all likelihood, the state may go no further than to require that
one be willing to affirm a general commitment to uphold the
Constitution and faithfully to perform the duties of the position he
holds. 22
3. While neither the first amendment nor the fifth amendment
19. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. ~ussell, 384 U.S. 11 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) (disclaimer oaths and affidavits). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (extramural criticism of the school board protected by the first amendment);
Mclaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (labor union membership protected);
McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970) (state university may not constitutionally reject teacher's employment application on the basis of his declared homosexuality);
Morrison v. State Bd. ofEduc., I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375,82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969)(teacher's
private homosexual conduct not affecting his performance on the job does not justify revocation
of his teaching certificate); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189,58 Cal.
Rptr. 520 (1968) (public schoolteacher may not be transferred out of the school for wearing a
well-trimmed beard in defiance of the principal's ban).
20. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
21. See cases cited in note 19 supra.Seealso United Statesv. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).ln
Robel, the Court stressed the fact that the employee did not occupy a sensitive position, citing
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). For additional cases holding that union membership
eannot be forbidden, see Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F 2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); American Fed'n ofState,
County & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v.
Charlotte,296 F.Supp.i068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
22. Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D.Colo.), affdper curiam, 397 U.S. 317 (1970).
See also Israel, Eljbrandt v. Russell-The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 193.
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entitles a teacher to withhold information when his employer has
questioned his competence or professional integrity on the basis of
reasonably specific and creditable allegations of impropriety related
to his job, information elicited under such circumstances by a public
employer may not be utilized for purposes of criminal prosecution,
and vague or general fishing expeditions on mere suspicion are not
permissible. 23
Two areas which remain most controversial are the degree of
protected extramural utterances, especially those utterances that may
be critical of the school or university itself, and the degree of a
teacher's freedom within his own classroom. A review of two recent
Supreme Court decisions may indicate the dimensions of the
problems.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, 24 the Supreme Court reversed
the determination of a county board of education which concluded,
after conducting a full hearing, that the newspaper publication of a
local teacher's letter-critical of the way in which the board had
handled proposals to raise new revenue for schools and factually false
in certain respects-was per se sufficiently harmful to the operation of
the schools to warrant the teacher's dismissal. The board also took
the position that the teacher, by virtue of his public employment, "has
a duty of loyalty to support his superiors in attaining the generally
accepted goals of education and that, if he must speak out publicly, he
should do so factually and accurately, commensurate with his
education and experience."u. In this respect, the board seemed to
stand on high ground. Even the 1940 Statement of Principles of
Academic Freedom and Tenure, promulgated by the American
Association of University Professors and endorsed by more than sixty
national educational associations, appears to lay this degree of
constraint at least upon those who teach at the college or university
level:
As a man of learning and an educational officer, [the college or university
teacher] should remember that the public may judge his profession and his ,
23. See, e.g., Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 {1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
{1957); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 {1956); Murray v. Blatchford,307 F. Supp.
1038 {D.R.I. 1969); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969).
24. 391 u.s. 563 {1968).
25. /d. at 568-69 {emphasis added).
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institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should
exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others,
and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional
spokesman.:zc

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court disagreed with the board's dismissal
of Martin Pickering on constitu,tional grounds: in the absence of
specific evidence that Pickering's letter had in fact adversely affected
the operation of the schools, a factually unsupported presumption of
harm per se could not be used to override the teacher's first
amendment freedom of speech. Responding to the claim that the
teacher owed the board a duty of loyalty to avoid public dispargement of its judgment on the operation of the schools, the Court
observed:
[f]he question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of
legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration,
including the School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to
popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question free and open debate is
vital to informed decision-making by the electorate. Teachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissa1.27

Thus, even on matters of educational policy where the ultimate
employer has exercised a proper prerogative in asserting a public
position of its own, the attenuated employment relation.ofthe teacher
several times removed from the board may not be used to imply a
rigid oath of fealty, forswearing all right to extramural dissent-at
least on issues immediately determined at the polls. Moreover, while
accuracy and moderation may be desirable standards for a teacher to
cultivate when moved to enter such dissent, they are not conclusive.
Where the teacher's dissent concerns an issue which is not so
intimately associated with his customary duties that his opinion will
gain remarkable public influence from his presumed access to special
facts, and where he makes no claim of greater skill or knowledge
26. Republished in AAUP PouCY DocUMENTS AND REPORTS 2 (Sept. 1969) (emphasis
added). But see Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances, id. at 11: "Extramural
utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for his position."
27. 391 U.S. at 571-72. See also Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968) (student newspaper editor
dismissed from public university for publishing in another newspaper his disagreement with
college president on the proper regulation of guest speakers entitled to reinstatement on first
amendment grounds).
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associated with his job and neither seeks to trade upon his
employment relation nor represents that he speaks other than as a
private citizen, 28 the board may not insist upon the same exacting
standards of accuracy and professionalism to which the teacher may
be held accountable in his performance of work properly within the
employment relationship itself. Where "the fact of employment is
only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of
the public communication by [the] teacher," 29 the threat to a teacher's
livelihood for mere carelessness in extramural utterance is
constitutionally incompatible with the first amendment protection of
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.
While the Pickering decision thus marks an extremely important
step in defining the substantive rights of teachers, the Court's careful
balancing and weighing of competing interests permits further
refinements as additional cases arise. 3° For instance, dicta in
Pickering quite clearly indicate that a teacher may not publicly
ventilate whatever-thoughts he harbors, however deeply felt his need to
do so, with indifference to certain enforceable constraints specifically
associated with his position as an employee. In this respect, it is
instructive to note certain facts which were not involved in Pickering
to indicate the effect their presence might have on the outcome of
other cases:
I. None of the information publicized in Pickering's letter drew
upon facts that he learned solely as a consequence of his employment.
Had it done so, the result might have been different: the extramural
release of information acquired under specific conditions of
confidentiality might provide a sufficient basis for dismissal on the
claim that the ability of one's administrative superiors and colleagues
to exhibit a degree of frankness essential to the operation of the school
would be impaired if they were forced to operate under the risk that

''.
i.

''

:-·

i·
I'

~' ''

''
28. Pickering signed his letter only with his name. 391 U.S. at 578.
29. /d. at574.
30. For recent applications of Pickering, see Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir 1970);
Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); McGee v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r,
257 Md. 36, 263 A2d 210 (Ct. App. 1970). See also Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415
F 2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304, 306-07 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 901 (1964); Rosenberg v. Allen, 258 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F .2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Watts v. Seward School Bd.,
421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1967), vacated per curiam, 391 U.S. 592 (1968),judgment reinstated,
454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), {:ert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970); Belshaw v. City of Berkeley,
246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966). Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App.
2d 147,23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962).

! '
I

{

}

'',•',·

i
''
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every memorandum, proposal, policy, or conversation could become
a subject of instant public notice at the whim of disaffected
individuals within the institution.
Should the outcome be different, however, if the information
released in a deliberate breach of confidence pertained to a subject
that school authorities were falsely representing to the public, that
involved an undisclosed policy of the school which was itself illegal, or
that was clearly a matter which, viewed objectively, was reasonably
subject to the influence of public judgment and review concerning the
operation of the school? Pickering is so heavily qualified by the Court
that it provides no easy answer; neither do recent developments
in companion areas of the law-administrative law and
libel-uniformly point in one direction. The first amendment may
require, however, that an institution which seeks to discipline a
teacher for the unauthorized disclosure of information acquired solely
in the course of his employment may do so only pursuant to clear and
specific rules respecting confidentiality; such rules must likely be of
narrow compass and serve a compelling institutional interest in order
to provide substantial justification for the constraints of
confidentiality .31 Possibly the outcome may even depend upon the
retrospective ad hoc public importance of the disclosure
itself-whether it truthfully brought to light a matter of serious
institutional impropriety which would have gone unattended but for
the very breach of confidence involved in the employee's conduct,
assuming of course that the employee had first attempted to raise the
issue intramurally by whatever means the institution provided.32 The
public· interest served b.y vindication of the employee's freedom to
speak out under these circumstances may outweigh whatever
marginal tendency the result has to inhibit utter frankness in the
normal operation of the school. Indeed, it is arguable that such
"frankness" or "secrecy" should be discouraged in any case in order
to decrease the institution's temptation knowingly to pursue improper
or illegal internal policies which it would hope to screen from public
view by some customary in terrorem reliance on rules of in-house
confidentiality.
2. The criticism of board policy explicit in Pickering's letter
31. See Meehan v. Macy, 392 F 2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified on reconsideration, D.C.
Cir. No. 20,812, August 23, 1968 (adjustments in light of Pickering).
32. See Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260,425 P2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967).
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transcended any purely work-related grievance of his own and did not
seek some premature advantage of public leverage in the redress of a
personal complaint. Thus, since its subject bore directly on an issue
currently before the electorate-consideration of a proposed tax
increase to be used for educational purposes-the letter served a
central function of the first amendment; moreover, its publication had
no tendency to undermine established procedures for the orderly and
efficient review of individual, work-related complaints. These factors
may be instructive in two regards. The avoidance of disruption to
intramural efficiency may support an employment requirement that
teachers forbear from ignoring established channels for the review and
redress of work-related grievances and institutional policy and
similarly forbear from bringing outside pressure to bear upon the
operation of those institutional processes. Simultaneously, however,
the failure of an institution to provide adequate internal mechanisms
for the fair and orderly review of an employee's request to be heard on
work-related matters, at least to the extent that these matters reflect
on the overall institutional quality or policies of substantial public
interest, may entitle him to bring the matter to public attention
without unreasonable apprehension that such conduct will imperil his
job. Specifically, the public interest to be served in protecting a
teacher's freedom to speak in protest and his own right to petition for
redress or grievances 33 must be weighed against the adequacy of
institutional channels in determining whether efficiency in
administration fairly requires greater circumspection in his public
utterances.
3. The Pickering case did not involve the public airing of
disagreements between Martin Pickering and anyone with whom he
was closely associated as a working colleague or subordinate. Indeed,
the Court explicitly left open the possibility that a teacher could be
dismissed for publishing a letter so critical of those in immediate
supervisory contact with him that, whatever its truth, it would
necessarily lead to intolerable personal relations in the future,
impairing the efficient operation of the school and requiring that one
of the employees be transferred or terminated: "Appellant's
employment relationships with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser
33. See Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F2d 304 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 90 (1964);
Jackson v. United States,428 F2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Klein v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 260 Iowa
1147,152 N.W.2d 195 (1967).
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extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of close workmg
relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning." 34
The point is clear. As one who would "rather be right than be
President" must also be prepared to relinquish his post in the
President's cabin~t as the price of·publicly airing his differences with
the President, teachers in equivalent positions of immediate
subordinate responsibility cannot expect that the first amendment will
secure their position against a loss of personal confidence which may
follow from their public ventilation of every difference in opinion or
policy judgment between them and their immediate superiors. As
schools and universities grow in size, independence and specialization
of employment functions, and impersonalism in working relations,
however, it is doubtful whether this observation about Pickering
should properly apply to many situations.
4. Perhaps the most troublesome qualification on this seminal
case results from the Cou~'s great stress upon the fact that the letter,
albeit partly inaccurate, was entirely without public impact and was
"greeted . . . with massive apathy and total disbelief." 35 Moreover,
the Court continued, the inaccuracies involved only items of trivial
detail not pertaining to matters upon which the public would presume
·that Pickering had special access or information; he was, at worst,
merely careless without knowingly or recklessly misrepresenting
anything. At the same time, the Court did imply that were a teacher's
extramural, inaccurate utterances made knowingly or with cavalier
disregard for their truth or falsehood, their publication might .. call
into question his fitness. to perform his duties in the classroom" and
serve as some ..evidence of the teacher's general competence, or lack
thereof' 38 even though they still had no effect and were not concerned
with a subject within the teacher's special skills or range of
information.
As a logical exercise, the Court's concession is not without appeal:
one who is reckless with the truth in any respect may indeed invite
34. 391 U.S. at 570. See Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 312 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
see also Jones v. Battles, 315 F. Supp. (D. Conn. 1970). In Lefcourt, the court approved the dismissal of a legal aid attorney whose criticism of his superiors had a "definite impact on the
internal operation of the Society" and threatened the "confidence and close working relationship" necessary to the effective operation of the Society./d. at 1112-13.
35. 391 U.S.at570.
36. /d. at 573.
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some question concerning the degree of care and preparation he
employs in his professional calling. As a matter of common
experience, however, the proposition is almost certainly unsound:
while preserving the most rigorous personal standards within their
professional specialty, teachers, like others, may occasionally be
foolish almost beyond belief outside the area of their one particular
discipline. Beyond this, moreover, if one must fear that even his
extramural utterances on political matters wholly unrelated to his
work can be seized upon as the pretext for questioning his entire
professional competence and standing, his freedom of speech will
surely be chilled and his teaching against the greater prerogatives of
other private citizens gravely disadvantaged. In addition, elemental
considerations of political realism suggest that even reckless
inaccuracy in extramural expression is in fact unlikely to occasion any
inquiry into the teacher's classroom competence unless the point of
the expression offends those with power to press the inquisition.
Precisely because the Court's suggested standard is too susceptible to
abuse and misapplication for purposes of retaliatory dismissal, it
should not be allowed at all.
Whatever the shortcomings of the Pickering decision, it does
provide a firm first. step in defining the protected boundaries of a
teacher's freedom of extramural expression. Unfortunately, however,
the guidelines are less clear in the only noteworthy decision to date
respecting the scope of academic freedom within the classroom itself
and the extent to which the Constitution will protect teaching
freedom-the prerogative of the teacher to teach his subject according
to his best professional understanding. The decision is Epperson v.
A rkansas 31 in which the Supreme Court, discerning no reason for a
statutory prohibition on the consideration of evolutionary theory in
any state-supported educational institution beyond the legislature's
desire to accommodate distinctly religious interests, condemned the
statute as a violation of the religious establishment clause of the first
amendment. The decision is not entirely satisfactory even on its own
terms, since the Court has seldom upset a law because of misgivings
about the motives of those who enacted it; rather, the Court has
sustained the law if it possibly serves any permissible objective. 38 And,
37. 393 u.s. 97 (1968).
38. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968). "It is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." /d. at 383.
For an extremely able treatment of the role oflegislative motivation in constitutional law, see
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as Mr. Justice Black observed in his concurring opinion, the
prohibition may have been adopted merely to remove a subject of
endlessly disruptive controversy from further consideration within the
public schools,39 an arguably permissible objective.
More. importantly, however, the decision placed no reliance upon
any constitutional claim of the individual biology teacher to some
personal degree of academic freedom in the presentation of the subject
she had been employed to teach. To the contrary, at several points
individual Justices broadly implied that no constitutional support
exists for such a claim in the face of the power of the state to designate
the content of state-supported curricula. Thus, Mr. Justice Black
declared:
[f]here is no reason I can imagine why a State is without power to withdraw
from its curriculum any subject deemed too emotional and controversial for its
public schools.
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children
takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological,
economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not
want discussed. . . .
I question whether .....academic freedom" permits a teacher to breach
his contractual agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school
authorities who hired him . . . . [I]t is doubtful that, sitting in Washington,
[this Court] can successfully supervise and censor the curriculum of every
public school in every hamlet and city in the United States. I doubt that our
wisdom is so nearly infallible}8
•

The difficulty, however, is not stated with complete fairness when
presented in such broad dilemmatic terms. One may readily concede
that the contending preferences of teachers, students, parents, and the
members of an elected board of education must necessarily be distilled into overall curricular decisions by some group with ultimate
responsibility; among these groups, authority to make such decisions
logically devolves upon the more democratically accountable board
or, as a general reeourse, upon the legislature. They, at least, are
subject to the orderly and formal check of the electoral process, the
informal influences of various groups including P.T.A.s, student
organizations, professional education associations and teacher
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law. 19
(1970).
39. 393 U.S. at 112-13.
40. /d. at 112-14.

YALE

L.J. 1205
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unions, and the admonitions of the federal Constitution such as the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Moreover, the school
classroom and, albeit to a distinctly lesser extent, the university
classroom are not at all free and voluntary forums in which the
remunerated teacher may appropriately assert the same full measure
of his own freedom of speech available to him as a citizen in private
life. Students compelled by law to attend classes constitute a wholly
captive audience neither free to depart if offended by, or in
disagreement with, the teacher's utterances nor free even genuinely to
offer dissenting views against the presumed authority of the teacher,
armed with his command of sanctions over classroom decorum, the
awarding of grades, and the dispensing of personal recommendations.
The teacher receives a salary for his hired service; he is employed for a
specific task; and he is insulated within his classroom even from the
immediate competition of different views held by others equally
steeped in the same academic discipline. Indeed, the use of his
classroom by a teacher or professor deliberately to proselytize for a
personal cause or knowingly to emphasize only that selection of data
best conforming to his own personal biases is far beyond the license
granted by the freedom of speech and furnishes precisely the just
occasion to question his fitness to teach. 41
If these considerations are sufficient to forbid the teacher to
impose his own orthodoxy upon his students, however, they apply
with equal force when the prescription for biased treatment of a given
subject or the mandate to use the classroom as an instrument of
ideological proselytism is fashioned by a legislature or a school board
instead-a legislature or school board that so rigidly determines the
exact and preselected details of each course that in fact it employs the
teacher as a mere meehanical instrument of its impermissible design.
For instance, it may be relatively unimportant that Commager's high
school text on American history is uniformly purchased in bulk and
prescribed as the basic text in high school civics in lieu of a similar
text by Jones or Smith unless its particular selection plus detailed
proscriptions of any classroom reference to other texts, other
impressions, and other historical ideas cumulatively combine to
describe a process of unfree education and academic indoctrination.
41. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Charles James,
N.Y. Comm'r of Educ. No. 1895 (Sept. 23, 1970) (dismissal upheld for repeated usc of
classroom by teacher to intcJjcct his personal views on a political issue unrelated to the regular
subject matter).
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Indeed, arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of information or
opinion, resulting not from understandable budgetary constraints or
the restraints upon the time available for study by teachers and
students, are precisely what the first amendment disallows. Against a
school board decree requiring the inculcation of one theory and
forbidding mention or examination of another, for instance, a mere
taxpayer should have standing to contest his compelled financial
support for the propagation of ideas to which he is opposed: .. [1] can
think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the
First Amendment than to compel persons to support . . . ideologies
or causes that they are against." 42 Against a state law provision that a
student might be disciplined for consulting any source of education
save that prescribed in regimented detail, the student could also
succeed on a first amendment claim ... In our system students may not
be regarded as the closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate." 43 Correspondingly, neither must
teachers or professors en_dure similarly arbitrary restrictions in the
course of their own inquiries or upon their own communicated
classroom references. One may not, as a condition of his employment,
be made an implement of governmental practices which are
themselves violative of the first amendment. Accordingly, a teacher
violating a statutory restriction forbidding reference to, or
consideration of, a source of opinion or information otherwise within
the proper compass of his subject should be as much shielded by the
first amendment from prosecution or dismissal as a social worker
refusing to conduct a midnight search forbidden to the state by the
fourth amendment." Concurring in Epperson, Mr. Justice Stewart
more nearly recognized the presence of important first amendment
issues beyond the valid but limited reach of the religious
establishment clause:
It is one thing for a State to determine that "the subject of higher mathem?tics,_

or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be included in its public school
curriculum. 1t is quite another thing for a State to make it a criminal offense
for a public school teacher so much as to mention the very existence of an entire
system of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I think, would
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the
First Amendment. . . .45
42. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,873 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
43. Tinkerv. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969).
44. Cf. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(l961).Seea/so R. O'NEIL, supra note 9, at 81-83.
45. 393 U.S. at 116.

858

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:841

In one of the last of the political litmus-test cases, the Court quite
appropriately recalled the rhetoric of Judge Learned Hand: "The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.' " 46 Within the very classrooms where the· nation's future
leaders are trained, no robust exchange at all would be possible if the
State were constitutionally free to select just one view of any given
subject and to instruct its teachers to avoid mention or consideration
of any other. Consistent with the constitutional sense of Judge Hand's
declaration, therefore, it must simply follow that no teacher or
professor may be subjected to dismissal for refusing to yield to such
an authoritarian demand. It is a pity that the Court in Epperson
declined the opportunity more specifically to reaffirm the pointY
PRETERMINATION PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS

"The history of liberty," Mr. Justice Frankfurter once observed,
"has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards." 48 The point is especially well taken with respect to
teachers: assuming that a given teacher's employment may not be
terminated or discontinued on grounds offensive to the Bill of Rights,
in theory, the difficulty of ascertaining the basis of a termination
decision and of securing redress after the fact will-to the extent of the
difficulty-effectively nullify the substantive protection itself.
Suppose, for instance, that a public school teacher on annual
contract simply fails to receive any notice that his teaching contract is
being renewed for the coming year. Or suppose that an assistant
46. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603( 1968).
47. At least three federal courts have recently extended constitutional protection to classroom
assignment and discussion prerogatives of a teacher's academic freedom. See Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala.
1970); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969). See also
Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), affd, 348 F.2d 464, cerl. denit'd, 382
U.S. 1030 (1965); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 386-87 (1955):
By Lehrfreiheit [the German term for academic freedom], the German educator meant
two things: He meant that the university professor was free to examine bodies of evidence
and to report his findings in lecture or published form-that he enjoyed freedom of
teaching and freedom of inquiry . . . • In addition, Lehrfreiheil . . . also denoted the
paucity of administrative rules within the teaching situation: the absence of a prescribed
syllabus •.•.
48. McNabb v. Unted States, 318 U.S. 332,347 (1943).
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professor in a state college receives notice that his three-year contract
is not being renewed and, upon inquiry, is advised that it is contrary to
institutional practice to provide a statement of reasons under such
circumstances. Or suppose that a full professor in a state whose
legislature has neither adopted a tenure system nor even delegated
authority to the state regents to provide one receives notice in midyear .
that his service will terminate the following June. In each case, the
teacher may believe that one of the reasons significantly contributing
to his termination involved a standard forbidden by the Bill of Rights
such as a response to a protected extramural utterance or retaliation
for a disfavored political affiliation. Alternatively, he may vaguely
suspect that false gossip of his private life or groundless rumors about
his teaching, factors which he is convinced were utterly without
foundation, contributed to the decision. Or again, he may simply be
genuinely puzzled about the reasons for his dismissal. In the absence
of procedural safeguards antecedent to the effective date of his
termination, the substantive protection he presumably enjoys may be
altogether lost.
If he is possessed of extraordinary fortitude, he may in these
straits retain private counsel to file suit in a state or federal court,
alleging that the action taken against him was based on certain
constitutionally prohibited grounds. Then, he may seek to invoke the
court's assistance for discovery purposes, more definitely to ascertain
the reasons and evidence leading to his termination, and thereafter
attempt to prove at his own expense the infringement of his
substantive constitutional or statutory rights. On that basis, he may
eventually recover damages, be reinstated by court order, or at least
secure the useful judicial declaration that the institution, rather than
he, was at fault. 49
In view of the practical difficulties of litigation, however, it is not
surprising that there have been vastly fewer such successful cases than,
for instance, the number of cases which the American Association of
University Professors' annual cascade of investigative reports have
considered meritorious in point of fact. Faculty members are not
litigious by nature, the costs of formal controversy are high and
usually must be borne personally, the burden of proof-often
exceedingly difficult to carry-falls upon the plaintiff-teacher, and the
49. The appropriate federal statutes for a federal action alleging violation of constitutional
rights in this situation are28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4)(1964) and42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985(3) (1964).
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ordinary case may not reach judgment for months or even years after
the plaintiff has been separated from his job. In addition, the teacher
must face the practical recognition that the extralegal hazards of such
litigation are themselves quite great: to sue and to lose establishes a
public record against oneself as a teacher and may further prejudice
one's chances for employment or advancement. To sue and to win will
not permit one actually to resume teaching at the institution in most
instances, and it will almost certainly spread upon the public record
whatever evidence of the plaintiffs shortcomings the defending
institution can muster-thereby warning other institutions which may
be chary of seemingly irascible professors who sue their employer and
·~launder their linen" in public places.
Without question, therefore, the effective protection of the
substantive constitutional rights of teachers and professors may
critically depend upon the availability of pretermination procedural
due process. Post-termination judicial remedies for teachers, like
post-suspension remedies for students50 or post-eviction remedies for
tenants,51 are often simply too little and too late. IncJ,eed, by analogy
to these other areas of remedial concern, the courts have gradually
recognized a separate constitutional right to pretermination
procedural due process.
The source of a teacher's constitutional right to pretermination
procedutal due process may be found in a variety of places. The most
obvious location is the necessary procedural implication of each and
every substantive constitutional right which government is forbidden
to deny or to abridge even when it acts as an employer. To the extent
that the first amendment forbids a public institution to terminate a
teacher's employment because of some extramural utterance, for
instance, the amendment itself may necessarily establish some degree
of entitlement to the protection of an effective pretermination
procedure sufficient to arrest the substantive violation before it can
take hold. To the extent that the institution need not state a reason for
its decision to terminate, and post-termination judical proceedings
necessarily prove to be grossly inadequate as a deterrent or corrective
of a first amendment violation concealed in the institution's decision,
the first amendment itself implicitly affords the right to a
50. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. ofEduc., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930(1961) (public university students may not be indefinitely suspended in the absence of
pretermination procedural due process).
51. SeeThorpev. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam).
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pretermination hearing or at least to some right of efficacious
intramural or administrative review sufficient to assure the timely
protection of freedom of speech. Similarly, to the extent that the equal
protection clause protects a teacher from termination on grounds
which are "patently arbitrary or discriminatory," adequate
protection from such a denial of substantive equal protection requires
a right of access to a degree and form of pretermination procedural
due process essential to determine and to abate the substantive
violation. The point is straightforward and reasonably self-evident.
Were the courts to continue to declare on the one hand that the
teacher has a substantive freedom from discriminatory termination
decisions and yet, on the other hand, deny that he is entitled to the
minimum procedural due process essential to the effective and timely
vindication of that freedom, the law would indeed be cruelly cynical:
"Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right-not to be
arbitrarily injured by Government-which the Court purports to
recognize. What sort of right is it which enjoys absolutely no
procedural protection?" 52
Once provided by law, moreover, a second source of substantive
rights may also imply a degree of constitutional entitlement to
whatever form of procedural due process is essential to their
protection as well-rights affirmatively established by statute,
administrative order, or the common law. Where the state has chosen
to protect one's status beyond the minimum required by the Bill of
Rights by providing, for example, that teaching contracts shall be
renewed or continued except on certain specified grounds such as
incompetence, medical disability, or insubordination, one's statutory
right to continued employment may imply an entitlement to whatever
degree of procedural due process is essential to insure the protection of
that statutory right. 53
A third basis for an independent constitutional requirement of
procedural due process may exist when the proposed action of the
government would do more than terminate the individual and would,
in addition, inflict an injury on some aspect of his personal liberty of
52. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. "[Appellant] is entitled to have procedural due process observed in the protection of these
substantive rights even though substantive due process would not compel the rights to be given."
United States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951), affd, 344 U.S. 561
(1953). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 97 U.S. 254 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951); Homer v.
Richmond,292 F.2d719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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which he may not be deprived without due process. Thus, where
institutional conduct injurious to the teacher's personal standing
apart from the loss of his job-for example, dismissal on published
grounds of racial bigotry-accompanies termination, the teacher's
right to protection of his personal reputation entitles him to the
observance of procedural due process as a precondition to
governmental deprivation of that aspect of his personal liberty.
"[W]henever there is a substantial interest, other than employment by
the state, involved in the discharge of a public employee, he can be
removed neither on arbitrary grounds nor without a procedure
calculated to determine whether legitimate grounds do exist."~ In an
entirely complementary fashion, where government induces a private
person to commit himself and to establish a dependency subject only
to a given number of express and implied risks which the individual
assumes, a subsequent decision to terminate him on other bases
disadvantages him beyond this loss of his job as such; indeed, it leaves
him far worse off than had he not been induced to accept government
employment in the first instance. Termination does not leave one's
economic situation as it was in the absence of the original
employment opportunity:
Inter"ruption of an existing relationship between the government and a
contractor places the latter in a different posture from one initially seeking
government contracts and can carry with it grave economic consequences.
We need not resort to [a] colorful term such as "stigma" to characterize the
consequences of such governmental action, for labels may blur the issues.
Thus to say that there is no "right" to government contracts does not resolve
the question of justiciability. Of course there is no such right; but that cannot
mean that the government can act arbitrarily, either substantively or
procedurally, against a person or that such person is not entitled to challenge
the processes and the evidence before he is officially declared ineligible . . . ,GS

Again, therefore, a government employee's "right" not to be
economically disadvantaged by government on grounds other than
those propery expressed or implied in response to governmental
54. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F2d 672, 678 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). See also K.
154-55 (1965).
55. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F2d 570,574 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (emphasis added) (opinion by
Burger, holding that an interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act favorable to the
claimant made it unnecessary to decide whether the Constitution itself required some
pretennination adjudicative due process).
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
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inducement may necessarily imply a modicum of procedural due
process essential to protect that right.
Finally, an independent right to procedural due process may be
found in the accumulating judicial recognition that one's status in the
public sector is itself a form of "liberty" or "property" which, while
subject to forfeiture as any other aspect of liberty pursuant to strict
procedural safeguards, nevertheless is an interest not to be divested
without adequate procedural safeguards to minimize unreasonable
risks of error or prejudice.56 Sinc.e 1961, for instance, the federal
courts have taken the position that a student receiving a state
subsidized education for which he performs no productive service in
return 57 may not be dismissed from college absent a high degree of
pretermination procedural due process. Eschewing the word-loaded
dilemma of characterizing a student's status as one of "right" or
"privilege" for the purpose of determining the minimum procedure to
which he is entitled under the fourteenth amendment before his status
may be altered, one court has observed:
Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege, the fact
remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, especially to those
students who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of
their college training. Private interests are to be evaluated under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in
terms of their true significance and worth. 58

While there is no equivalent case law support developing the extent of
pretermination procedural due process for teachers, their
commensurate entitlement should be self-evident. ''[W]ith respect to
the right to procedural due process, the protection to be afforded a
professor can hardly".be less than that afforded a student, and
probably should be greater." 5»
Emphasis of these preliminary points on the just claim of teachers
to pretermination procedural due process has been essential simply
because of the paucity of cases. Practically all of the successful
56. For a discussion of the property theory of defeasible interests in the public sector, see
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245,
1255 (19.65) (favorably noted by Mr. Justice Brennan in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262
n.8 (1970)); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For a brief description of the
liberty theory of defeasible interests in the public sector, see Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 20, at 1081.
57. Maintenance of grades and observance of rules are continuing conditions of his
attendance but hardly the bargained-for economic exchange of a contract.
58. Knight v.State Bd. ofEduc.,200 F.Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
59. Laffertyv.Carter,310 F. Supp.465,470 (W.O. Wis. 1970).
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litigation by teachers has been limited solely to establishing protection
from certain grounds of termination-nonrenewal, nonrehiring, or
nonhiring. Because the post-injury judicial processes are massively
inadequate to avoid the use of such grounds in fact, however, the
tentative elaboration of pretermination procedural due process for
teachers now appears to be at least equally critical in the evolving law
of teachers' rights.
While the Supreme Court has not yet held unequivocally that
either a tenured professor or a probationary public school teacher is
entitled to any degree of constitutionally-compelled pretermination
procedural due process, recognition of the proposition appears
reasonably certain. In 1956, the Court's dictum in reversing the
summary termination of a tenured public university professor noted
the absence of any orderly inquiry into his continuing fitness or
competence to hold his job and declared that .. the summary dismissal
of appellant violates due process of law." 60 In 1970, the Court cited
the same case for the proposition that ''procedural due process must
be afforded" one who faces discharge from public employment. 61 The
central thesis appears nearly to have won the day, and the critical,
remaining issue involves a determination of the extent and form of
procedural due process on a case-by-case basis.
Two principal considerations should be borne in mind in the
particular elaboration of pretermination procedural due process for
teachers. The first is that the right to procedural due process does not
contemplate a single, frozen, stylized method of trial-type procedure
irrespective of the subject in controversy or the gravity of the
outcome. The second consideration, a corollary to the first, is that the
particular degree and form of procedural due process constitutionally
required in a given situation is determined by means of a juducial
"cost-benefit" analysis which weighs the predicament of the
individual against the costs to society in moving only with required
ponderous formality. While certain requirements-notice and, to a
lesser extent, an opportunity to be heard-are fairly characteristic of
most constitutionally-compelled proceedings, the configuration of
most other procedural rights is determined by a complex of particular
cost-benefit concerns. A rather full panoply of particular procedural
rights might, for instance, include all of the following:
60. Slochowerv. Board ofEduc., 350 U.S. 551,559 (1956}.
61. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397. U.S. 254, 262-63 ( 1970} (emphasis added}.
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1. Terminal action may not be taken other than pursuant to
regularly established rules or standards which have been made
available to the employee ·and which are reasonably precise and clear.
2. Proceedings to terminate the employee must be preceded by
specific notice of charges providing a statement of facts sufficient to
warrant the action contemplated. Adequate time must be provided to
enable the employee to prepare for the ensuing hearing, and a list of
witnesses plus access to other evidence proposed for introduction at
the hearing must be made available to him on request.
3. The hearing must be held before an impartial trier of fact, the
1
outcome of the hearing determined solely on the basis of material
placed in evidence in the course of the hearing, and a record must be
made of the proceedings.
4. The employee may be represented by counsel present during
the proceedings; the employer must provide notice that counsel will be
furnished upon request in the event the employee is unable to retain
counsel.
5. The employee is entitled to know the evidence offered against
him, to confront adverse witnesses, to conduct cross-examination
either personally or through counsel, to offer evidence and witnesses in
his own behalf, and to testify in his own behalf or decline to do so
within the privilege against self-incrimination.
6. The teacher may appeal an adverse decision by briefs and oral
argument, based on the record, with the scope of review de novo on
alleged errors of law (that is, an incorrect interpretation of the
allegedly infringed rule) and limited on findings of fact to determine
whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole.
In fact, however, probably no instance of teacher termination
would activate all of these possible procedural rights as a matter of
constitutional law, and the particular combination of any two or
more of them will vary in an extraordinary fashion depending upon a
number of considerations:
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and
its content varies according to specific factual contexts . . . . Whether the
Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding
depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved,
the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all
considerations which must be taken into account. 82
62. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also id. at 487-88 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the
office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations
that must enter into thejudicialjudgment. 63

Without question; however, the degree of pretermination
procedural due process to which a public employee is entitled is most
heavily influenced in favor of the employee by the degree of total
hardship which may ensue as a consequence of that termination.
Where the hardship may be great, the need for procedural safeguards
against the risks of error and prejudice is correspondingly high.
In Greene v. McE/roy, 64 for instance, the Court noted that
revocation of a security clearance without a full hearing had
effectively deprived an aeronautical engineer of the opportunity to
pursue his long-established career not only with the particular private
manufacturer who discharged him solely as consequence of the
government's action 65 but with virtually all other employers offering
jobs at his skill level. As a result of the government's action, Greene
was forced to take other work at a greatly reduced skill level and at
one-fourth of his former pay. Considerably influenced by
constitutional considerations, the Supreme Court held that the
security clearance revocation based on statements by unidentified
informants, depriving the employee of "the traditional procedural
safeguards ..of confrontation and cross-examination," 88 was not
authorized by federal statute. 67 The case is especially instructive, since
the Court was obliged to balance the employee's need for information
against the government's interest not only in national security but in
the protection of confidential sources who might be unwilling to
provide critical information should disclosure of their names and
testimony be required.
63. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
64. 360 u.s. 474 (1959).
65. The employer discharged the engineer because his access to classified information,
foreclosed by the government's action, was essential to the performance of his job.
66. 360 U.S. at493.
67. /d. at508.Seealso Parkerv. Lester,227 F.2d 708,720 (9th Cir. 1955).
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In contrast, the Court's five-to-four decision three years later in
Cafeteria Workers v. McE/roy 68 upheld exclusion of a short-order
cook from the cafeteria of a gun factory upon the Commandant's
unilateral decision, without any notice or hearing, that the employee
failed.to meet security requirements. Noting that the employee had
already secured equivalent employment elsewhere, that the exclusion
had not affected equivalent employment opportunities in general, and
that the basis of the decision implied little stigma,89 a slim majority
held that neither notice nor an. opportunity to be heard was
constitutionally required.
The great weight of the "hardship" factor in the rationing of
procedural due process is also well illustrated in several recent
Supreme Court decisions outside the employment field. In Goldberg
v. Kelly,1° the Court held unconstitutional the termination of welfare
benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing which was otherwise
elaborately provided following termination. Noting the critical
consequences of termination to the person left totally destitute, the
Court concluded that despite the potentially high costs to
government-loss of money to recipients who would be judgment
proof against recovery of payments illegally received, administrative
burdens and costs of providing a hearing, and the tendency to ignore
ineligible recipients rather than undergo the nuisance of
pretermination hearings-procedural due process would require
"timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting
any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally. " 71
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp./2 the Court held that the
requirements of procedural due process command that ~ wage earner
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in court prior to the
freezing of one-half of her wages attached by an alleged creditor, even
though the employer simply intended to hold the attached wages
subject to the order of the court following the later full trial of the
creditor's claim. The hardship to the wage earner in the loss of even
68. 367 u.s. 886 (1961).
69. "[f]he Superintendant may have simply thought that Rachel Brawner was garrulous, or
careless with her identification badge." I d. at 899.
70. 397 u.s. 254 (1970).
71./d.at267-68.
72. 395 u.s. 337 (1969).
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one-half of her means of support, plus the coercive effect of the freeze
to force a settlement without contesting the creditor's claim in an
ensuing hearing, were grave enough consequences to require notice
and an opportunity to be heard in court in advance.
In In re Gault/3 the state's considerable interest in preserving the
informal and nonadversary nature ofjuvenile delinquency proceedings
was subordinated to the needs of the threatened youngster who, were
he found delinquent, could be incarcerated for years. Thus, the Court
determined that the juvenile's right to procedural due process required
specific notice of alleged particular misconduct, representation by
counsel, adversary proceedings in court, and the availability of the
privilege against self-incrimination-all as essential constitutional
requirements to avoid "unfairness to individuals and inadequate· or
inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy ." 74
In Jenkens v. McKeithen/ 5 a state criminal investigatory
commission, without any prosecuting or formal sanctioning power
but with authority to determine and publish its official opinion
concerning the guilt of those charged with criminal misconduct, was
required "to afford a person being investigated the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to
traditional limitations of those rights" 7& as well as the right to present
his own position personally and through witnesses. The public stigma
to a person under investigation was itself virtually enough to activate
fair substantial procedural rights on behalf of the individual. 77
These cases clearly suggest that the hardships to the individual
which provide a partial measure of the degree of antecedent
procedural due process to which he is entitled necessarily embrace not
only the loss of his particular status immediately placed in jeopardy
by the employer-such as his job-but also the probable impact on
his opportunities elsewhere and the larger repercussions to his
reputation as well.
In the teaching field, moreover, significant public interests allied
with the teacher's interests further tip the balance in favor of
73.
74.
15.
76.
77.

387 U.S. I (1967}.
/d. at 19-20.
395 u.s. 411 (1969}.
/d.at429.
Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.420 (1960).
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pretermination procedural safeguards.78 It is, in fact, a false view of
the matter to suppose that the proper balance is merely one of
weighing the needs of the individual against the needs of society -a
balance which would nearly always assure from the outset that the
individual's interest would weigh more lightly. While the Supreme
Court has not yet given a separate constitutional status to academic
freedom as such,79 it has nevertheless repeatedly emphasized that the
protection of individual teachers is critical to protect the public
interest in teaching, research, investigation, publication, and
education itself and that procedural due process for teachers is critical
to the public stake in intellectual pluralism and the advancement of
knowledge. As a consequence, the balance to be struck in
apportioning requirements of procedural due process is not one of
choosing between the needs and rights of the individual and those of
the state, but between certain proper concerns of the state and certain
very substantial public interests directly served by protecting those
who teach from arbitrary !]ecisions:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
78. Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134
(1959), is especially instructive on this point. In Barenblatt, the majority sustained the
conviction of a former graduate student who had refused to answer the questions of a
congressional investigative committee concerning his present or past Communist affiliations,
thereby violating a federal statute which made it a misdemeanor for a witness before such a
committee to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry. Disclaiming the majority's
balancing of the petitioner's freedom of speech against the government's right to "preserve
itself," Mr. Justice Black asserted that "laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms
can[not) be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process." /d. at 141. Moreover, he
continued:
But even assuming . . . that some balancing is proper . . . I feel that the Court after
stating the test ignores it completely . . . . [I ]t completely leaves out the real interest in
Barcnblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a whole in being able to join
o-ganizations, advocate causes and make political "mistakes" without later being
subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves . . .. This
result ..• is doubly crucial when it affects the universities, on which we must largely rely
for the experimentation and development of new ideas essential to our country's welfare.
It is these interests of society, rather than Barcnblatt's own right to silence, which . . .
the Court should put on the balance against the demands of the Government . . . .Id. at
144.
79. See Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 3; Murphy,
Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 447
(1963). For other selected writing on academic freedom and tenure, see C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN,
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1959); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); R. KIRK, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (1955); R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME (1955); Machlup, On Some
Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955); Symposium,
AcademicFreedom,28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.429 et seq. (1963).
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That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." . . . The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection." 80

We may therefore reasonably expect that the courts will acknowledge
constitutionally compelled pretermination procedural rights of
teachers with at least as much generosity as in the case of other public
employees. A federal district court recently held that a 59-year-old
university maintenance mechanic with fourteen years of service could
not be dismissed for allegedly assaulting his supervisor and
threatening others without "advance written notice [of specific
charges] with the opportunity to respond either in writing or by an
informal appearance," 81 even though he was otherwise assured of an
elaborate post-termination process of administrative review. One may
readily suppose that pretermination notice and opportunity to be
heard are at least equally required procedural requisites for professors
at the same university. Similarly, since a federal court of appeals has
recently held that a part-time attending physician may not be
dismissed from a municipal hospital and stigmatized by an allegation
of racism in the absence of a "full hearing" preceded by a reasonably
precise and specific written statement of reasons for the proposed
action, 82 termination of a teacher on alleged grounds similarly
detrimental to his career and reputation may surely require at least the
same extent of pretermination procedural due process.
Within the past year, several federal court decisions have fulfilled
specific prophecies of a professorial right to pretermination
procedural due process. They have done so, moreover, where the
teachers were merely probationary appointees, early in their careers,
on short-term contracts, and termination occurred simply from notice
of nonrenewal furnished well in advance of the end of the term.
In Roth v. Board of Regents, 83 an assistant professor on a one80. Keyishian v. Board of Regenls, 385 U.S. 580, 603 (1968) (emphasis added). See also
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,261-63
(1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952).
81. Olson v. Regenls,301 F. Supp.l356, 1361 (D. Minn. 1969).
82. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F2d 672,679 (2d Cir. 1966). ·
83. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.Q. Wis. 1970). Accord, Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir.
1970); Ferguson v. Thomas,430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
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year contract, without tenure and in his first year of teaching, was
notified by the state university president five months before the end of
the academic year that his employment contract would not be
renewed. In spite of the teacher's youth, his slight dependency on his
job in the very first year, the absence of any published ground
stigmatizing his reputation or character, the absence of evidence
specifically indicating grave personal hardship in finding employment
elsewhere, the fact that the contract was only for one year and was
simply not renewed rather than being terminated during the term, the
obvious needs of the institution to reserve discretion in judging the
performance and excellence of probationary appointees before
committing itself to tenure, and the institution's concern that the
ordeal of elaborate procedures in mere nonrenewal cases might well
force upon it a system of instant tenure with the cost to society of
insulating mediocrity, the court concluded that pretermination
procedural due process would require the following minimum rights:
I. A statement of the reasons why the university intends not to
retain him, to be furnished upon his request;
2. Notice of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated
reasons, to be provided upon his request:
At such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity to submit
evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The burden of going forward and the
burden of proof rests with the professor. Only if he makes a reasonable
showing that the stated reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision
or that they .are wholly. without basis in fact would the university
administration become obliged to show that the stated reasons are not
inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact. 84

Within three weeks··of Roth, a federal district court in Alabama
held that several instructors given notice of nonrenewal well before the
84. /d. at 980. But see Nelson v. County of los Angeles, 362 U.S. I (1960) (opinion by Mr.
Justice Brennan): "Doubtless a probationary employee can constitutionally be discharged
without specification of reasons at all; and this Court has not held that it would offend the Due
Process Clause, without more, for a State to put its entire civil service on such a basis, if as a
matter of internal policy it could stand to do so." /d. at 16. It is clear, moreover, that the courts
will continue to allow the utmost latitude with respect to what constitutes a "not inappropriate"
basis for failure to renew a probationary teacher. For instance, a reasonable desire to upgrade
the quality of a given department by bringing in new faculty members with greater experience or
credentials may be sufficient reason to terminate a probationary instructor upon fair notice of
nonrenewal; it is not at all necessary that the decision of nonrenewal reflect a judgment that the
instructor's performance of his teaching duties was inadequate in any respect. See Fluker v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., __ F. Supp. __ (M.D. Ala. 1970). The tentative advances in
the enlargement of pretermination procedural due process ought not be seen as a threat to
institutional autonomy in the formulation of substantive standards.
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end of the expiration of their second one-year contracts had "not been
accorded procedural due process" and were entitled to "formal notice
and specification of the charges and a hearing" before termination by
nonrenewal could become effective. 85
Almost simultaneously, the same Wisconsin federal district court
that decided the Roth case also reinstated several tenured and nontenured state university professors who were merely suspended with
full pay, but excluded from the campus, because the institution
regarded the teachers' continuing presence during highly disruptive
campus events as an immediate danger. No notice was furnished to
explain the way in which their presence allegedly contributed to the
danger, however. Neither was any preliminary hearing provided prior
to the suspension nor assured at the earliest practical time following
such interim suspension, assuming that emergency circumstances
made even a preliminary prior hearing impractical. 81
More instructive than the fact that the courts in these cases
specifically based the result on the teachers' constitutional right to
procedur~l due process, or the fact that each represents an extension
of the form of that due process beyond anything hitherto recognized
in comparable circumstances in any other court, is the particular
weighing process which was employed. In Roth, by far the most
elaborate of the several cases, the court noted the following items
which weighed in favor of the claim for notice, statement of reasons
on request, and an opportunity for hearing:
l. Of 442 non-tenured teachers at the university, only four were
given notice that contracts would not be offered them for 1969-70.
Thus, the technical consideration that the employee was merely on a
one-year contract and altogether lacked tenure simply was not
conclusive of the real situation. Where customary practice indicates,
as it did in Roth, that continued employment is ordinarily to be
expected and nonrenewal is extraordinary (less than one percent of
probationary employees did not receive contracts for the following
year), the alleged need of the university employer for complete
freedom of summary termination will be tested according to the
reality of the situation rather than the legal form. The point for public
school teachers on annual contract where, however, nonrenewal is
equally exceptional is a valuable one. Indeed, where nonrenewal is
85. Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., _ F . Supp. _(M.D. Ala. 1970}.
86. Lafertyv.Carter,310 ~.Supp.465 (W.D. Wis.l970).
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otherwise a relatively rare event, the administrative burden of
furnishing a written statement of reasons and an opportunity to be
heard on request cannot be onerous. Similarly, the very fact that
nonrenewal may be known to be a rare event in the practices of the
particular institution makes the act of nonrenewal in a given case a
much more severe judgment than otherwise and one which is
correspondingly more likely to affect a teacher's opportunities
elsewhere as well. As a consequence one is entitled to a fuller measure
ofpretermination procedural due process.
2. The nonrenewal arose during political controversy on
campus; inde6d, the terminated teacher separately alleged that the
decision not to renew was in retaliation for expressions he claimed
were protected by the first amendment. The court was quick to discern
that the theoretical constitutional protection of such a substantive
right could readily be subverted in the absence of some minimal
pretermination procedure: "Substantive constitutional protection for
a university professor against non-retention is useless without
procedural safeguards." 87 Thus, the prophylactic value of
pretermination procedures under the circumstances was reasonably
essential not merely to protect the teacher's economic and
reputational interests but his substantive constitutional interests as
well.
3. The job impact on the teacher in his prospects for relocating
elsewhere was more substantial than in the Cafeteria Workers case,
involving potential exclusion from many, not just one, places of
employment; the pub lie interest in his protection was greater, given
the public benefits flowing from the protection of academic freedom;
the custom of authoritarian operation of universities is nowhere near
as firm or habitual as that of military installations; and the
governmental reason for acting and withholding the basis so to
act-national security-is without qualitative counterpart on behalf
of the university.88
87. 310 F.Supp.at979-80.
88. The reasoning and basic pretermination procedural guarantees developed in Roth were
applied four days later by the same court in behalf of two public school teachers whose annual
contracts had not been renewed:
[A] teacher in a public elementary or secondary school is entitled to a statement of the
reasons for considering nonrenewal, a notice of a hearing at which the teacher can
respond to the stated reasons, and the actual holding of such a hearing if the teacher
appears at the specified time and place. A necessary corollary to this proposition-not
stated in the opinion in Roth-is that the Board's ultimate decision may not rest on a

874

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:841

Moreover, substantial educational support is accruing for the
emerging judicial view that the reasonable protection of institutional
discretion to evaluate its probationary academic staff does not require
the perpetuation of wholly summary and unreviewable powers of
nonrenewal or termination. In the majority of colleges and
universities, the authority to make these decisions is delegated in the
first instance to the senior faculty of each' department. Even so, the
American Association of University Professors, which tends to draw
a high proportion of its members from the senior faculty ranks and is
very much influenced by considerations of quality control, has
recently proposed procedural standards virtually equivalent to those
set down in Roth. 89 As courts may appropriately defer in otherwise
doubtful cases to the judgment of those closest to the firipg line of
education, professional recommendations such as these may
themselves contribute to the formation of the constitutional norm.
EPILOGUE:

Is IT

A

Constitution

WHICH THE COURTS HAVE BEEN

EXPOUNDING?

The formulation of degrees of pretermination procedural due
process immediately· responsive to the very particular facts of each
case does, as previously suggested, accurately reflect the Supreme
Court's method of constitutional analysis of such matters. Initially,
moreover, it seems entirely proper that constitutional courts should
lay heavy emphasis upon the special facts actually present in each case
in determining what due process may require under the particular
circumstances. The duty of the court is, after all, only to answer on
the case that grants it the authority to speak at all. It is rather for
legislatures or rule-making administrative agencies to provide justice
by larger categories-justice wholesale-through the enactment of
broad rules more or less inclusive of only roughly similar activity.
basis of which the teacher was never notified, nor may it rest on a basis to which the
teacher had no fair opportunity to respond.
Gouge v. Joint School Dist. 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970). See also Orr v. Trinter, Civ.
Act. No. 70-163 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Domenicone v. School Comm., R.I. Comm'r of Educ. No.
_
(May 20, 1970). Compare Thaw v. Board of Pub. Instru~tion, No. 29488 (5th Cir.
Sept. 22, 1970) (public school teacher on probation without expectancy of renewal and not
alleging interference with a substantive constitutional right is not entitled to a pretermination
hearing); Shirck v. Thomas, 315 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., No. _(D.N.H. June I) (unreported), appeal pending, No. 7667 (1st Cir. 1970).
89. See Report ofCommittee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Procedural Standards in
the Renewal or Nonrenewal ofFaculty Appointments, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 21 (1970).
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Article 111 courts have a different and more limited function: to decide
particular cases, avoiding broad and premature pronouncements
beyond the exigencies of the case, and to secure constitutional justice
at retail in response more exactly to each individual situation.
It is difficult to complain, therefore, that the very close contextual
application of varying degrees of procedural due process illustrated by
the Supreme Court's decisions in Greene and in Cafeteria Workers
may in fact be a little too precious, that the technique tends to make
intellectual sport of differences bordering on picayune detail, or that
something about its basic style does not fit the construction of a
constitution. Certainly the decisions do not represent an unprincipled
brand of ad hoc constitutionalism. They are not at all ad hoc in the
pejorative sense of representing whimsical changes of constitutional
values, for there was in fact commendable continuity in the selection
of values to be considered and in the relative weight assigned to each
value. Rather, the decisions are ad hoc only in the desirable sense that
particular differences of fact quite properly affected the merit of the
petitioners' claims that each had been denied due process. The
relevance and weight of the effect of termination upon the career of
the employee, for instance, remained the same in measuring the
requisite degree of pretermination procedural due process in the two
cases; it was simply the lesser degree of hardship in fact which may
have spelled the difference in the particular outcome of each case.
To suggest alternatively that it is unseemly for the Supreme Court
serially to review a careful, albeit lengthy, list of cost-benefit due
process considerations against the facts of each particular case,
moreover, creates the risk of being identified as a critic who would
favor a more wooden, careless, and anti-intellectual standard of
constitutional review-a standard which ignores close factual
distinctions of obvious importance to the more thoughtful mind,
squeezing actually dissimilar situations into the pretense of sameness
and summarily dispensing justice in a grand manner but with very
little heed for the particular consequenees. Something more than an
appreciation for the easier aesthetics of categorical constitutionalism
is surely required to make the case that the Court's current technique
suffers some inadequacy.
Nevertheless, something is disturbing about the current mode of
procedural due process analysis which operates with such everlasting
Frankfurterian fine-grained finesse that one wonders whether it is, in
fact, a constitution which is being expounded. That the judge-made
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common law of torts should yield different results on the basis of
slight factual nuances, perceptively seen and wisely distinguished by a
common law court, is probably not distressing to other judges, to
lawyers, or to clients and laymen with the patience to understand. It is
simply less believable, however, that even the vague and general
written standards fixed in the Constitution either contemplate or
require a technique of judicial needlepoint that turns the applied
definition of "due process" upon the problematical ramifications of
each discrete factual complex in which the claim is raised. While we
do not blanch at the thought that a common law court may resolve an
issue of proximate cause differently in two cases upon a close
examination of the manner in which seven, eight, or nine elements
were exactly involved in the particular accident, the assumption that
the Constitution contemplates similarly molecular judicial activity in
the administration of any of its provisions is more nearly incredible.
If in Cafeteria Workers, for instance, Rachael Brawner had not
· been swiftly placed in a nearly identical job through ihe effort of her
union, should the Court have concluded that her summary discharge
was lacking in procedural due process, requiring her reinstatement
pending some fuller procedure? If in Roth, on the other hand, the
university had been able to show that Roth had secured an equivalent
position elsewhere by the time the case came on for argument, would
it then be clear in retrospect that procedural due process had not been
disregarded in the peremptory manner of his termination by the
university? Or if the percentage of those nontenured faculty members
routinely not renewed at the Oshkosh branch of the University of
Wisconsin had been 20 percent, rather than 1 percent or 5, 12, or 18
percent, would the practice of summary nonrenewal be unoffensive to
the fourteenth amendment? To raise these annoying possibilities is not
merely to ply a bothersome style of pedagogy which shows an overly
sensitive appreciation for the possible limitations of a given case; it is,
rather, to suggest the ground for acute discomfort that fundamental
law, constitutional law, can credibly permit such nuances of slight
distinction to affect the outcome of particular cases.
Several very high and eminently practical costs are connected,
moreover, with a technique of constitutional interpretation which
measures the application of a given clause according to the exquisite
particularity of a large assortment of factual variables in each discrete
case. Some of these are well illustrated by the difficulties which the
Supreme Court encountered in employing this same style of
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constitutional analysis to the constitutional right to counsel at the
trial stage of a felony prosecution. In Betts v. Brady, 90 the Court did
not hold that appointment of counsel was never required as a matter
of due process but merely that the risks of error and prejudice were
not sufficient on the facts of the particular case to make failure to
appoint counsel fatal to the constitutionality of the trial. The outcome
of other cases, the Court implied, could depend upon the specific
involvement of many facts-the age of the accused, his experience
with the criminal process, his degree of formal education, the
complexity of the charge, the character of the legal issues, the gravity
of the offense, and so forth. 91 The rigor of the analysis assumed an
unrealistic degree of specialized learning in the nuances of due process
on the part of state trial judges, however, and the same assumption
was made concerning counsel responsible to insure the preparation of
a record adequate for review by appellate courts. The Supreme Court
itself was repeatedly petitioned to review a swelling number of cases,
more-or-less alike, with each decision expending the scarce resources
of the Court but yielding a result of extremely limited value beyond
the resolution of the immediate case. A number of probably erroneous
convictions remained untouched, moreover, due to the sheer
incapacity of the system to examine them with the required degree of
exacting scrutiny. The factorial complexity of the "proper" due
process test may well have produced substantial instances of
individual injustice.
To be sure, this byproduct of closely-reasoned, closely-limited due
process decisions would be largely avoided were public bodies to
shape their rules to be categorically overinclusive of the exact
constitutional requirements declared by the Court. For instance, had
each state responded to Betts v. Brady by providing that counsel
would automatically be appointed upon request of an indigent
involving criminal proceedings above the grade of petty offense, the
generosity of the legislative response would have eased the problems
of clients, lawyers, trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme
Court. Thus it may be fair to suggest that the fault was not necessarily
with the Court's style of particularity of constitutional analysis, but
with the grudging character oflegislative and administrative response.
In similar fashion, congestion, confusion, and endless post-Roth
90. 316 U.S.455 (1942).
91. See id. at462,472.
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litigation may readily be avoided if universities would now move to
provide a general rule that anyone whose contract is not renewed shall
receive several months advance notice, a written statement in
explanation upon request, and an adequate opportunity for informal
review upon request prior to the effective date of the notice. The
constitutionally overinclusive generosity of these new rules might
provide a practical and desirable response to the problem.
However, recent history itself indicates that public bodies seldom
respond in this fashion, least of all when they are hostile to the
substance even of the courts' closely limited decisions. Disagreeing
with the judicial decision and believing that it works an unrealistic
hardship upon themselves and upon their view of the public interest,
legislative and administrative agencies may predictably resist its
gratuitous extension by any action of their own. Indeed, the technique
of constitutional interpretation employed by the courts may itself
contribute to this phenomenon; after all, didn't the Court itself
say-or at least imply-that a slight difference in the facts would have
made it plain that due process does not require, and that preponderant
public interests might be disserved by, overly protective procedural
standards that are expensive to society and inessential to fundamental
fairness? If slight changes of factual circumstances are sufficient to
make a constitutional difference, ought they not be equally important
as a matter of sound administrative policy as well? In short, may it
not be true that the technique of closely fact-limited constitutional
analysis as distinct from a somewhat more categorical assessment
itself invites the problems of closely-limited legislative and
administrative response?
These conjectures aside, the original point remains: a
constitutional description of procedural due process in which the
requirement for each item of procedural regularity critically depends
upon a piecemeal review of a vast assortment of adjudicative facts
actually established in each individual case fundamentally detracts
from the common need to know what the Constitution requires and
from the common desire that the Constitution speak with greater
majesty.
It is clear, moreover, that needlepoint analyses are not inherent in
constitutional review. In Gideon v. Wainwright,' 2 the Supreme Court
abandoned the ••truer" -more elaborate and specifically fact92. 372

u.s. 335 (1963}.

.
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oriented-approach it had attempted to pursue after Betts v. Brady,
signalling that it would no longer presume to know what differences in
age, education, and simplicity of issues might theoretically contribute
to the constitutional requirement of appointed counsel. Rather, it
weighed the issues on broader facts, categorically concluding with the
blunter proposition that due process requires appointment of counsel
as an indispensable step to the integrity of the proceedings. The
decision in one sense, to be sure, rested on a less intellectual approach
than that used in Betts v. Brady. Applied retrospectively, it may even
have resulted in the reversal of some convictions where the absence of
counsel was not in fact prejudicial. It may also have operated further
to increase the cost of administering criminal justice, even as it left
other issues still unclear93 and failed by any means to insure fairness to
the accused. 9' But it would be utterly unreasonable to insist that
Gideon would constitute an end of the general matter; it was merely a
new beginning.
The departure taken in Gideon does, moreover, warrant specific
comment if only to note hs essential divergence in judicial technique
from the still continuing, multiple fact emphasis in due process cases
including the administrative termination of public employees. The
two lines of approach have gone along, side by side, with little notice
taken of the gradual divergence in basic technique. As the federal
courts gradually gain a greater fund of experience and confidence in
the constitutional review of public employment cases,· however, it is
entirely possible that the need will be seen to resolve these cases too in
broader terms and larger categories of similarity. On balance, it is a
prospect that deserves en.couragement.
93. For example, at what point in the process must counsel be offered? With what grade o
offense'?
94. Indifferent lawyers, attracted only by the small public fee in the case, would come
forn ard to go through the motions of representation as required by Gideon.

